We evaluate the effect of the 1989 shock over economic development in four Eastern European countries. We apply a counterfactual approach and define the shock alternatively as the trigger for economic openness, political competition, or both. The main result is an effect of economic freedom large than the one of democratization. In Poland and Bulgaria we find a positive impact of economic freedom, while in Bulgaria there is also a smaller effect of democratization. In Albania, after an initial recession, economic freedom helps recovery. Finally, Romania does not show any robust effect.
Introduction
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 set forth the final stage of the Soviet Union domination over Eastern Europe, and the consequent loss of influence over those countries. The set of reforms that followed determined a transition path from a centrally-planned to a market economy, and a simultaneous switch from dictatorship to democracy. Transition represented a season of deep institutional change whose costs sometimes outweighed the benefits. All Eastern European countries experienced an initial output fall, which has been more or less dramatic, more or less long lasting, according to each country's specificities. Two decades after 1989, disparities between among countries still remain.
Our research question is the following: given that the transition affected both economic and political aspects, which was the most responsible for the initial fall and subsequent upsurge in output? That is, which of these freedom is more important in shaping economic outcomes?
Transition countries seem a very good candidates to answer to these questions, given the unique "natural experiment" 1 they have been subject to.
To address overcome these issues we apply a counterfactual approach, the synthetic control estimator (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010; , which is best suited to address quasi experimental data. This methodology performs data-driven comparative case studies.
The synthetic control accounts for the presence of a time-varying impact of country unobservable 1 A natural experiment is an empirical study in which individuals (or clusters of individuals) exposed to the experimental and control conditions are determined by nature or by other factors outside the control of the investigators.
Thus, natural experiments are observational studies and are not controlled in the traditional sense of a randomized experiment. Natural experiments are most useful when there has been a clearly defined exposure involving a welldefined subpopulation (and the absence of exposure in a similar subpopulation) such that changes in outcomes may be plausibly attributed to the exposure. In this sense the difference between a natural experiment and a non-experimental observational study is that the former includes a comparison of conditions that pave the way for causal inference, while the latter does not (Dunning, 2012) . characteristics, and therefore overcomes a major drawback of more standard estimators. The advantage of this approach rests on the transparent construction of the counterfactual outcome of the treated country, that is, a linear combination of untreated countries. The comparison countries that form the synthetic control (and their relative weights) are selected based on their similarity to the treated country before the treatment takes place, both with respect to past realizations of the outcome and the standard explanatory variables used in the growth literature.
The simultaneity between democratization and liberalization makes our treatment a bidimensional one. Therefore, the choice of the donor pool is crucial. If we argue that the fall of the Berlin Wall triggered growth through the democratization of Eastern European countries, we should select only the pool of non-democratic countries as donors. Similarly, if we believe that the Berlin Wall stimulated growth through the transition to market economy, we should select only countries that did not implement any economic reform. Therefore, we perform three experiments: one in which the donor pool is made of countries that did not experience democratization (we call the nonpolitically free), one with the countries that did not go through economic liberalization (noneconomically free), and finally a donor pool that included countries that neither implemented political nor economic liberalization (non-free).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on economic transitions in Eastern European countries. Section 3 presents the methodology and the data we use, whereas results are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Literature
This paper is related to more than one strand of the literature, drawing insights from the economics of transition and the political economics that explain the role of both economic and political competition on growth.
The economics of transition has as its main object the study of the formerly socialist countries after 1989. This region, albeit geographically well-defined by a number of contiguous states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, is extremely heterogeneous. Scholars distinguish five main clusters: Central-Eastern European countries (CEEC), Baltic Republics, South-Eastern European Countries (SEEC), Yugoslavia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For the purpose of this work, the argumentation will focus on CEECs (Slovenia, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) and SEECs (Bulgaria and Romania). Albania does not fit into any category, having the poor income level of some CIS countries and the degree of exposure to Western Europe comparable to Yugoslavia and CEECs (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011: xviii) .
The attention of the scholars to transition economies derives from the uniqueness of the natural experiment provided by the end of the monopolistic political power of the Communist Party.
This shock led to political freedom, which in turn was followed by economic freedom. The sequence of the two transitions, however, is blurred by the internal country dynamics. As an example, reforms in Hungary started in 1968 with the launch of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), that is far before the political status quo was questioned. In Poland, before being advised by the IMF in the 1990s, 2 an attempt to move away from central planning was made in the 1980s, with the generation of severe fiscal imbalances. Interestingly, the negative social impact of the deregulation of prices in Poland was mitigated by the opposition of the Solidarność union, which obtained the wage indexation. This aspect makes another link between democratization and economic price liberalization.
From the economic perspective, the literature usually refers to the two main strategies adopted by those countries as "big-bang" and "gradualism" (Dewatripont and Roland, 1993) . They differ according to the speed of the reforming process, and they are supported or criticized on the basis of uncertainty concerns (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995) . Interestingly, Marangos (2004) argues that the shock therapy was inconsistent with a democratic process of decision-making, and that those governments established after 1989 opted for gradualism to cope with internal consensus. This perspective intensifies the link between the two types of transition we study. Nonetheless, the initial pre-transition conditions seem to be the ones that explain the policy adopted: countries with a good economic situation preferred a big-bang strategy, e.g. Poland and the "Balcerowicz program".
Albania was a poor country and implemented an "aborted" big-bang policy. Finally, also the SEE country, Bulgaria and Romania, resorted to gradualism. The initial conditions matter also for the attractiveness of FDI, which were almost absent before 1994. FDI concentrated mainly in CEEs, i.e. Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary (Bevan and Estrin, 2004) .
In the early stage of transition all the countries experienced an output decline, 3 regardless the strategy adopted. The reason of the depression was explained with the persistence of communism (Brenton et al., 1997) . Przeworski (1991) , however, describes the time consumption pattern under both gradualism and big-bang as U-shaped curves, with big-bang being narrower and deeper, indicating a stronger negative effect at the beginning of the process and a faster recovery compared with gradualism. Overall, scholars find successful examples of both gradualism and shock therapy reforms (Heybey and Murrell, 1999) . Claessens and Djankov (2002) find a beneficial effect of privatization on the productivity of enterprises in all the CEEc and SEEc countries, except for Romania. Two decades after 1989, the CEE and SEE countries have diverged, both in terms of growth measured by GDP per capita and in terms of the Human Development Index, being the CEEC always the most developed ones. In the light of these information, the question if a "synthetic 'real' socialist" country that did not experience transition would have performed gains traction.
In the aftermath of 1989, the attention to economic reforms was combined with a lively debate over institution-building (Roland, 2000 (Roland, , 2004 . In particular, the need for intervention was felt in the SEE countries and the Western Balkans, including Albania, which showed the highest rates of corruption in the area, 4 the lower reliability of rule of law and accountability mechanisms, depicting a dramatically low level of government effectiveness. 5 Consistently with these initial conditions, Albania faced a very slow political transition that lasted until the early 2000s. On the other hand, Poland started from a middle level, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in a rapid democratization process.
The second stream of literature concerns the relationship between democracy and growth.
This relationship is one of the most elusive in economics, since it is extremely weak (and most often negative). Barro (1996) analyses a cross-section of about 100 countries from 1960 to 1990, using a system of three equations. Estimations are done by instrumental variables: the instruments are the five-year earlier value of log GDP, the actual values of schooling, life-expectancy, rule of law and terms of trade, and the earlier values of the other variables (which include the fertility rate, government consumption ratio, public educational spending ratio, black market premium, investment ratio) involved in the estimations. A positive nonlinear effect is found: the middle level of democracy is the most favorable to growth, the lowest comes second, and the highest third.
According to Barro, maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption, and high human capital are the most important determinants of growth. Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) identify eight variables that can possibly be endogenous to democracy: political instability, governance distortions, government size, human capital, income inequality, trade openness, and physical capital accumulation. They find that the overall effect of democracy on growth is negative.
This result is the outcome of a positive effect on growth via human capital accumulation and reduction of income inequality, and a negative effect of reduced physical capital accumulation and increased government consumption. Persson and Tabellini (2009) argue democracy because investment reacts to expected returns, expected, and not just actual, regime change affects growth.
5 Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007) illustrates a return to pre-communist traditions and norms, suggesting the strengthening of a historical legacy over nowadays development that has been found in other environments. Specifically, Karaja (2012) provides empirical evidence of the impact of both the Ottoman and the Hapsburg legacy over growth in this region.
Growth will accelerate before an anticipated democratization, and decelerate well before an anticipated coup. In their model the probability of regime change depends on a country's "democratic capital". This capital is assumed to accumulate in years of democracy and in countries with democratic neighbors, but to depreciate under autocracy. The results are consistent with the model in two samples: one from 1960 to 2000, and another one dating from 1850 to 2000. Along the same line of "democratic capital", and dealing with a number of issues ranging from measuring democracy to modeling the dynamics of GDP in the years before democratization, Acemoglu et al.
(2014) find a significant and positive effect of democratization on GDP (about 20% in three decades, implying that the rise of democracy in the last 50 years has yielded about 6% higher world GDP). Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) consider democratization processes for about 65 countries over 1960-2000. They employ an event study approach and analyze growth before and after democratizations. The dynamic panel estimates imply that democratizations are associated with a one percent increase in real per capita growth. During the transition, growth is slow and even negative; after the third post-democratization year, growth peaks and then stabilizes at a higher level. Persson and Tabellini (2008) explore issues on the relationship between democracy and growth emphasizing the role of heterogeneity. They combine the above mentioned method with the propensity score matching estimator. This semi-parametric methodology relaxes linearity and it is therefore well suited for the study of heterogeneity. They uncover a positive but insignificant effect of transitions from autocracy to democracy.
The third strand addresses timing of political and economic liberalizations. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2008) apply a difference-in-difference methodology, exploring issues ranging from the relationship between political and economic liberalizations to the effect of democracy on growth. They find positive feedback effects between economic and political reforms. The timing of events indicates that causality is more likely to run from political to economic liberalizations, rather than vice versa, but feedback effects in both directions cannot be excluded. The sequence of reforms matters: countries that first liberalize and then become democracies do much better than countries that pursue the opposite sequence. Grosjean and Senik (2011) disentangle the direction of causality from democracy to support for a market economy, and from market development to support for democracy in a spatial regression discontinuity approach based on frontier-zones in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union that are under different political regimes but are integrated. They find a positive and significant effect of democracy on support for market economy, but no effect of liberalization on support for democracy.
Methodology and data
The setup of the counterfactual analysis requires a careful description of its main elements: the treated group, the treatment and the donor pool.
The set of treated units consists of Albania, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. The choice of the countries is dictated by data availability. These countries represent different clustered regions within Eastern Europe, as described in Section 2: Poland is part of the Central Eastern Europe, Bulgaria and Romania are Southern Europeans, whereas Albania is part of the Balkan area, was strongly insulated and deprived during the communist rule and, as seen before, does not belong to any of the groups in which Eastern European transitions countries are usually divided.
The outcome variable that we consider is a proxy for economic development, which we label GDP. It is measured as the PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant prices from the Penn World Tables 7.1 (Heston et al., 2012) . The "1989 treatment" is uniquely defined in time (the fall of the Berlin Wall in November) but it does not represent a clear-cut phenomenon. This step is fundamental, because "using inappropriate comparisons may lead to erroneous conclusions" (Abadie et al., 2014: 2) . Specifically, for the purpose of the present analysis the 1989 shock may represent: i) the trigger of economic transition, ii) the removal of barriers for political transition, iii) the beginning of a twofold transition. Depending on the treatment that we consider, we define three alternative sets of donors.
First, we include in the non-economically free donor pool all those countries that between 1995 and 2010 show the Economic Freedom index (EFW hereafter, taken from Miller et al., 2014) at most equal to the maximum initial level in the sample of treated units, that is EFW = 55.2 (see Figure 1 ). Secondly, we consider political freedom only, and we build the non-politically free donor pool with those countries that between 1995 and 2010 show a Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2012) DEMOC value equal to 0 in all the periods. Finally, we consider the 1989 shock as the trigger for a multidimensional transition, we include in the most stringent non-free donor pool those countries that are both non-economically and non-politically free. Appendix 1 lists the countries in each donor pool. Figure 1 shows the two indices for the countries included in the study. The index for democracy (or lack of it) is available for a much longer time than the economic liberalization index, which starts at the middle of the '90s. We see that political liberalization is much similar across countries than economic liberalization. The former jumpstarts in 1989 and, with the exception of Albania that experiences a shortly-lived retreat, it has an upward trend for all the countries. In turn, economic liberalization experiences one or more reductions in all the countries over the time-span we consider.
[ Figure 1 about here] Once the analysis has been set up, we build the synthetic control estimator as:
where m=1,...,k is the set of explanatory variables employed as predictors; X 1 represents the preintervention characteristics of the treated unit; X 0 includes the values for the donor pool (never treated); W is the vector of weights, ranging between zero and unity, attached to each observation in the donor pool such that the sum of the weights equals one; v m is a weight that reflects the predictive power of the m-th determinant on the outcome.
The synthetic control estimator of the treatment is given by:
where J+1 is the number of countries, where unit 1 is the treated one and j = 2,...,J+1 indicates the donor pool; w * is the synthetic control obtained with the minimization in equation 1, and GDP is the outcome variable. the share of population aged 15 and over that completed secondary level school, Schooling (Barro-Lee, 2013); a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is democratic, Dem; 6 the annual GDP deflator, Inflation (World Bank, 2012). 7 Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for these variables.
Given the issues raised in the previous Section and the methodology outlined here, we can spell out the specific questions we ask in this paper:
1. Did the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall cause growth in the Eastern European countries?
2. Was growth stimulated by economic or political transition?
3. Would a 'synthetic socialist' regime have performed better in transition countries?
Results
The counterfactual analysis is performed by inspecting figures reporting the pattern of the treated unit compared with the pattern of the counterfactual. Figure 2 The most striking results is that democratization did not affect the four countries in the same way. Poland and Bulgaria have always been more developed than the synthetic control unit, suggesting a positive impact of political transition over growth. This impact is stronger for Poland, a country that, as already pointed out, implemented the Balcerowitz Plan in 1989, and in the 1990s was heavily influenced by the IMF guidance through the transition process. Albania, after an initial decade of output fall, started growing more than the counterfactual; in Romania, on the other hand, democracy left unaffected, or slightly worsened, the economic conditions.
The limitation of the synthetic control method is that it does not allow to assess the significance of the results using standard inferential techniques. As suggested by Abadie et al. (2010) , however, placebo experiments can be implemented to draw inference. They assess whether the estimated effect for the treated country is large relative to the effect for a country chosen at random. Placebo testing compares the estimated treatment effect for the country under investigation with all the (fake) treatment effects of the control countries, obtained from experiments where each control country is assumed to leave real socialism in the same year of the treated country. If the estimated effect in the treated country is larger than those in most of the (fake) experiments, we can safely conclude that the baseline results are not just driven by random chance.
The placebo test in space illustrated in Figure 3 Similar results, but more clear-cut, are shown in Figure 4 , where we employ the set of noneconomically free donors. The fit of the algorithm improves, and we find a definite growthenhancing effect of economic freedom in Poland and Bulgaria, where the effect is larger than in 8 Following Abadie et al. (2011) we discard from the placebo tests all countries for which the RMSPE for the pretreatment period is more than three times larger than the RMSPE for the treated unit under consideration for the same period. showing a small gap between the actual pattern of GDP and the counterfactual. Moreover, this difference is not robust to the placebo tests in Figure 5 . This effect is probably related to the lack of benefits from privatization found by Claessens and Djankov (2002) . For the other countries, in contrast, the counterfactual always lies above or below the other fake treatments, therefore showing a robust positive effect of economic openness over growth (with the slight difference of Albania, for which we find a strong negative effect at the beginning and a strong positive effect at the end, whereas in the middle the counterfactual is mostly in line with the other fake treatments).
[Figures 4 and 5 about here]
When we use the donor pool of non-free countries we find results consistent with the previous discussion ( Figure 6 ), mostly in line with the pool of non-economically free countries. An exception is Romania, for which the counterfactual is always better than the actual pattern of GDP.
Unfortunately, due to the very small size of the donor pool, the robustness of the algorithm is weaker than before (Figure 7) , therefore these results should be taken with some caution.
[ Figures 5 and 6 about here]
Finally, we comment the construction of the synthetic control units. Appendix 2 shows the weights resulting from the algorithms presented in the previous section. As an example, we observe that the synthetic control unit for Albania using the non-politically free donor pool is obtained from the linear combination of Syria (0.782), Cuba (0.166) and Morocco (0.053). In general, we observe that Cuba contributes to the counterfactual in all the models, as expected given its nature of closed economy ruled by a communist regime. Furthermore, the set of matched donors differs with respect to its size and composition.
Appendix 3 shows the predicted balance between the treated unit and the donor pool, which is a broad measure of the goodness of fit of the linear combination. We observe that the lagged fiveyears averages of the GDP and population growth match quite well between the treated unit and the synthetic; Schooling does not match very well for Albania and Romania, while Investment and
Inflation show consistent divergence between the two columns. 9
If we look at the fit of the algorithm, we observe a good match between the treated unit and the counterfactual before the treatment, limited by the small number of countries in the donor pool.
The root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE), in fact, always shows large values. It measures the "lack of fit between the path of the outcome variable for any particular country and its synthetic counterpart" (Abadie et al., 2011: 18) . Nonetheless, we note that similar values have been found in the literature (e.g., Nannicini and Billmeier, 2013) and that the RMSPE is always larger for Poland and smaller for Albania.
Conclusions
In this paper we have performed a number of experiments to analyze the effect of the fall of the Berlin Wall on growth in four Eastern European countries. We applied a new methodology that allows us to address this issue taking into account the both observable and unobservable characteristics and to draw data-driven comparisons. The effect of 1989 is overall positive, although that the initial effect was negative and in some countries it lasted for a few years. Therefore, the answer to our first question is positive, whereas the answer to the third question is 'no'.
The fall of the Berlin Wall brought two changes: one on political institutions that became democratic, and one on economic institutions that allowed for private property of means of production and price liberalization. Overall, the effect of economic freedom is larger than the effect of democratization: in Poland and Bulgaria we uncover a large positive effect of economic freedom, while in Bulgaria we find also a smaller effect of democratization. This finding, which answer to our second research question, link our work to the larger literature on political and economic liberalizations. This result is in line with most of this literature but has been obtained in a way that allows us to take into account the idiosyncrasies that history causes on each country. Looking at individual countries, in Albania, after a strong initial recession, there is a recovery driven by economic freedom. The political system during transition was plagued by corruption, a Ponzischeme destroyed savings, and the initial conditions were quite bad, since the country was the most isolated among Eastern Europe. There was a strong migration that deprived the country from the young and potentially productive workforce. Poland is the opposite case: given its historical background in industrial production, it was able to build on these foundations and on the path towards the European Union. Dismantling the previous state-owned industrial companies was a demanding task, but the preconditions (also in terms of political leaders that were forged during the opposition to the Jaruzelski rule) were more benign than in other countries. Bulgaria and Romania have been lagging behind Poland: they started with worse political and economic preconditions, and their speed towards joining the European Union was slower. Romania, in particular, is an outlier in our analysis, since it does not show any robust effect comparing the actual with the synthetic economic performance. This effect is possibly related to the lack of benefits from privatization found by Claessens and Djankov (2002) . Syria 0.199 Vietnam 0.133 Note: typically the non-free sample is the intersection of the other two samples. When this does not happen, it is due to the algorithm of the software: for example in the case of Bulgaria, Syria belongs to the potential poll of donors for non-politically free countries, but it is not actually chosen in that treatment, whereas it is selected in the non-free treatment. 
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